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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
IS A SPRAINED BACK, SUFFERED ON THE JOB WHILE A 
PERSON PERFORMS HIS OR HER NORMAL TASK OF LIFTING, 
AN ACCIDENT FOR THE PURPOSES OF WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION IF THERE IS A MEDICALLY DEMONSTRATED CAUSAL 
CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE INJURY AND THE WORK? 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff, Gloria Carmen Herrera is a 25 year old 
female who, at the time of her injury, worked at Sperry Univac 
Corporation. (R. 3) 
2. She had worked there approximately six (6) months 
prior to the date of her injury. (R. 4) 
3. Her duties included picking up computer units from 
the ground and placing them on a conveyor belt. (R. 4) 
4. These units weighed between 20 and 100 pounds. (R. 5) 
5. This task involved a lifting and then turning motion 
while holding the computer unit. (R. 5) 
6. On May 3, 1985, the Plaintiff was lifting one of 
these units, and as she turned, she felt a pop in her back. (R. 
5) 
7. The Plaintiff reported the injury to her supervisor 
that day and then continued working. (R. 6) 
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8. She was thereafter examined by several doctors who 
diagnosed her as having suffered a sprained back* (R. 7) 
9. Medical examinations revealed a causal connection 
between the claimant's work task and her back injury (Report of 
Dr. Gene R. Smith, R. 47). (For ease of reference, a copy of 
this report along with the Administrative Law Judge's Finding of 
Fact and Conclusion of Law, and the Industrial Commission's 
Denial of Motion for Review are included as the addendum to this 
brief). 
10. As a result of this condition, the Plaintiff has 
constant backaches and headaches and cannot sit or walk for long 
periods of time. (R. 7) 
11. The Administrative Law Judge ruled, and the 
Industrial Commission affirmed that because the claimant's injury 
occurred in the course of her normal work duties, her injury was 
not the result of a compensable "accident" in that [t]here is 
nothing to take her activity on that day out of the realm of what 
could be considered usual and normal activities" (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge, R. 88-90; Denial of Motion for Review, R. 103). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission was in error in ruling that the 
Plaintiff suffered no "accident" when she injured her back during 
the normal course of her job. The determination of whether an 
"accident" has occurred should not depend on whether the injury 
was sustained during usual exertion or activities. Rather, the 
question should depend on whether there is an unexpected injury 
and whether there is a medically demonstrable causal relationship 
between the person's work duties and the unexpected injury. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UNEXPECTED INJURIES INCURRED WHILE 
PERFORMING ONE'S USUAL DUTIES SHOULD 
BE COMPENSABLE UNDER UTAH'S WORKMAN'S 
COMPENSATION LAWS WHEN A CAUSAL RELA-
TIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORK AND THE 
INJURY EXISTS. 
The Administrative Law Judge in this case ruled that a 
back injury occurring in the course of one's employment duties is 
not an "accident" compensable under Utah's Workman's Compensation 
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laws if the activity is "usual and normal." She also did not 
refer the case to a medical panel because she found there was no 
"accident". As the following discussion will demonstrate, this 
is an improper interpretation of Utah law. 
Utah Code section 35-1-45 states: 
Every employee...who is injured by accident arising 
out of or in the course of his employment... shall be 
paid compensation. U.C.A. section 35-1-45 
(Supp. 1984). 
It has been held that the meaning of the term "accident" 
is a question of law. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 p.2d 
888, 890 (Utah 1981). The term "...should be given broad 
meaning. It connotes an unanticipated, unintended occurrence 
different from what would normally be expected to occur in the 
usual course of events". Carling v. Industrial Commission, 16 
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202, 203 (1965). Injury caused by one's 
ordinary work task may be considered an accident even if no 
unusual exertion or activity is shown. A. Larson, 1 The Law of 
Workmen's Compensation, section 38.30, (1965). "The fact that 
overexertion is more apt to cause internal failure than is 
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ordinary exertion is no reason [to] ...require proof of 
overexertion to sustain an award." Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 201 P.2d 961, 969 (Utah 1949). 
However, in deciding whether an injury is an "accident", 
the Industrial Commission has adopted a test which unduly narrows 
the scope of the inquiry and which therefore excludes from 
coverage injuries that, being unanticipated and unintended, are 
"accidents". In reality, there are two categories of injuries 
which qualify as "accidents". The first category is comprised of 
unexpected activities which result in injury. An example of this 
category would be where an employee is run over by a run-away 
dump truck. When an injury falls into this category, the 
question of whether an accident has occurred is generally not an 
issue. 
In the second category, the injury takes the form of an 
unexpected result from an expected or normal activity. An 
example of this would be where an employee suffers a sprained 
back while lifting. Case authority can be found pointing both 
ways on the question of whether injury in the second category 
qualifies as an accident. One line of Utah cases holds that such 
injuries qualify as accidents. See Schmidt v. Industrial 
Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980). See also, Purity 
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Biscuit Co* v* Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961, 
969 (1949). However, another line of cases holds that such 
injuries are not compensable. Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, 
642 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah 1982); Farmer's Grain Co-op v. Mason, 606 
P.2d 237, 239 (Utah 1980); and Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints v. Industrial Commission and Thurman, 590 P.2d 328, 
329-30 (Utah 1979). The Industrial Commission has misinterpreted 
the latter line of cases to mean that injuries occuring during 
the course of one's duties are not accidents if the activities 
are usual and normal unless there is also present unusual 
exertion or abnormal activities. In reality in all of the above 
cases where no compensation was awarded, no causation was shown. 
Whether the activity was unusual or required extra exertion is an 
indicator of causation sometimes, especially in back cases, but 
it is not always determinative of causation. 
As the remainder of this discussion will demonstrate, the 
Industrial Commission is in error in relying on its 
interpretation of the Sabo line of cases for the following 
reasons: 
1. First, these cases were decided on the issue of 
causation as was the case they look to as their precedent; Redman 
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Warehousing Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 2d 398, 
454 P.2d 283 (1969). 
2. Second, the Industrial Commission's interpretation of 
the law is not in line with the majority of jurisdictions; and, 
3, Third, and most importantly, a narrow determination 
of "accident" is contrary to the objective of Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Law. 
A. The Precedent of Redman 
The cases holding that injuries incurred during the 
performance of one's normal duties trace the rule of law they 
aPPly t o Redman Warehousing Corp* v* Industrial Commission, 22 
Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969). Redman was a case involving a 
claim for back injury that first evidenced itself while the 
claimant was driving a moving van. Although driving the van was 
part of the claimant's usual duties, his duties also included 
loading and unloading the van. The Industrial Commission decided 
that the claimant's injuries were the result of driving the van 
and that this unlooked for result of his normal activities 
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qualified as an accident* However, this court reversed that 
decision on a finding of a lack of causal connection between the 
claimant's work activities and the injury. Id* at 285. 
The Redman court correctly decided that a claimant must 
be able to establish a causal connection between the injury and 
work. For, as the court stated: 
To conclude otherwise would insure every 
truck driver, every railroad engineer, 
every airplane pilot, and a lot of others, 
against a physiological malfunction or 
physical collapse of any of hundreds of 
human organs, completely unproven as to 
cause, but compensable only by virtue of 
the happenstance that the malfunction, 
collapse or injury occurred while the 
employee was on the job, and not home or 
elsewhere, (emphasis added) Id. at 285. 
As a consequence, Redman stands for the proposition that before a 
claimant may collect workmen's compensation for an injury 
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incurred on the job, he or she must be able to demonstrate a 
causal connection between his or her normal work duties and the 
injury sustained. 
However, the causation requirement of Redman as found in 
Sabo, Mason, and Thurman has been interpreted by the Industrial 
Commission into an over-simplistic rule which holds that only 
injuries occurring during nonordinary or unusual activity or 
exertion are compensable. Redman clearly does not stand for this 
rule. Redman simply turns on the court's inability to believe 
the Industrial Commission's finding that the act of driving a 
vehicle was the cause of the claimant's injury. ][d. at 285. 
Hence, there is no precedent in Redman for the requirement that 
all injuries occurring during one's normal job are not 
compensable and that unusual exertion need be shown. 
B. The Industrial Commission's decision disagrees 
with the majority position. 
In addition, the rule applied by the Industrial 
Commission disagrees with the majority rule. The majority of 
jurisdictions hold that when usual exertion leads to an internal 
breakdown of some sort, the injury is accidental. A. Larson, 1 
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The Law of Workmen's Compensation, Section 38.30 (1965). As a 
consequence, to uphold the Industrial Commission's decision would 
place Utah out of step with the majority of jurisdictions. 
C. The Industrial Commission1s rule is contrary to 
the objective of Workmen's Compensation Law. 
Finally, the rule applied by the Industrial Commission 
fails to compensate injures the rule was intended to identify as 
compensable. The word "accident" should be given a broad meaning 
to effectuate the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act which 
is to give workers injured on the job quick and easy access to 
benefits. Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Company, 15 Utah 2d 20, 386 
P.2d 616, 617 (1963); See also, Monfredi, pp. 890 and 892. The 
rule applied by the Industrial Commission purports to weed out 
claims where the injury is the result of coincidence and thereby 
only allow claims in which there exists a causal connection 
between the work task and the injury. However, in reality, 
because of its narrow and over-simplistic approach, the test 
achieves just the opposite result. It excludes claims, as in 
this case, when there is a clear and medically demonstrable 
relationship between the work task and the injury, while it 
invites claims for injuries that are the result of coincidence 
and happenstance. 
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The anomolous results engendered by this rule are 
illustrated by the following example. Suppose Party A and Party 
B both suffer back injuries while lifting a crate at work. Party 
A's normal task involves lifting and a medical examination 
reveals a degenerative condition in A's back, caused by the heavy 
labor, and that this condition culminated in the present back 
injury. On the other hand, Party B's usual duties do not involve 
lifting. However, a medical examination of B reveals a 
congenital condition in his back which has caused the back to 
degenerate to such a point as to be overly susceptible to injury 
and that the lifting conincidentally triggered this condition, 
resulting in the injury. 
In the case of Party A, there is no recovery under the 
Industrial Commission's rule because there was no unusual or 
nonordinary activity even though lifting on the job is the 
medically demonstrable cause of A's injury. On the other hand, 
Party B can recover even though the lifting wcis not really the 
cause but rather was merely a condition of the injury — the fact 
that the injury occurred on the job being merely fortuitous. 
The test applied by the Industrial Commission in this 
case lends itself to such results. It is a mechanical approach 
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which is circumstantial rather than causal oriented. Clearly, 
such a rule is over simplistic and not properly tailored to weed 
out claims where causation does not exist. 
The better test for "accident" would be whether the 
injury was unforeseen. This broad test would not be dispositive 
in most cases. It should be followed by a test of causation. 
Taking the evidence as a whole, does there exist a medically 
demonstrable connection between work and the injury. In other 
words, the work task must be shown to be the efficient cause and 
not merely a condition to the injury. As a consequence, in every 
claim of this nature, the case should be referred to a medical 
panel for a determination on the issue of causation. See, 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 696 (Utah 1980) 
(in the case of accidental injury, submission of the medical 
aspects of the case, including the issue of causation, to the 
medical panel is mandatory). In the present case, because the 
Administrative Law Judge did not find in favor of the existence 
of an accident she did not submit the case to a medical panel. 
Note that such a test would not change the results in 
any of the previously cited decisions. For example, as stated 
before, Redman can be explained on the basis of the court's 
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inability to believe that there was a causal connection between 
the claimant's back injury and his job of driving a moving van, 
in light of the fact that he regularly performed strenuous 
lifting without suffering injury. Ijd. at 285. 
Similarly, in Sabo, the claimant, although required to 
lift crates as part of his job, probably did not perform such 
tasks as his primary activity. I^ d. at 723 (claimant owned and 
operated a business known as Sabo's Electronic Service). Hence, 
as to him, lifting, although a condition to his injury, was, in 
all probability, not the primary cause. The same is true of 
Thurman. According to the medical report contained in the 
opinion in that case, the claimant suffered from a degenerative 
condition which does not appear to be work related. Ijd. at 330. 
Hence, his work task was also a condition rather than a cause of 
his injury. 
On the other hand, in Purity Biscuit this Court allowed 
compensation for back injury incurred during the normal course of 
the claimant's duties which included, among other things, driving 
a truck. !Ed. at 962. This decision was based on the Industrial 
Commission's finding that the claimant's work task, which 
involved a great deal of "stooping and bending in lifting heavy 
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packages" caused his spine to deteriorate to such an extent as to 
result in his injury. Id. 
Similarly, in the present case, the Plaintiff's doctor, 
Dr. Smith, reports that the injury was brought on by the 
Plaintiff's job of lifting. This evidence should not be 
disregarded and made of no import by an arbitrary rule of law 
that holds injuries occurring during "usual and normal" 
activities at work are per se not compensable. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that this 
court reverse the Industrial Commission's decision and remand 
this case for further hearing on damages. 
DATED this day of 
April, 1986. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
DENTON My^HATCH 
WESLEY M. LANG 
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ADDENDUM 
Medical Report of Dr. Gene R. Smith 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of 
the Administrative Law Judge 
Industrial Commission's Denial of Motion for Review. 
-17-
1»_ ..rRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
P. 0. Box 5800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Date of i n j u r y J ^ k l J ^ 5 " 
Employer S f e W y 
SUMMARY OF MEDICAL RECORD 
(To be completed by treating physician) 
RE: Permanent Impairment Evaluation for ur% CCLS> >w R ^  > AfCAA J?v2~ 
y Name of Applicant 
1. Has applicant been released for usual work? A/cD What date? 
2. Has applicant been released for light duty?. What date? 
3. Has applicant a permanent injury? If so, describe fully 
}\dVrltTtSi> ^ ^ ^ ' ' 
4. In case of permanent injury, on what date did or will the applicant reach 
a final state of recovery? dS)L ,/)y, /4vf cigars aw 
5. If there is a permanent injury, give your estimate of impairment in terms 
of percentage of loss of function: \OK^J <=>*<- fe ?c£ * "*~ /vf-/* &*<f> 
6. Is there a medically demonstrated causal relationship between the 
industrial accident and the problems you have been treating? y<«g<?r * Please 
explain as necessary ^ 
7. What future medical treatment will be required as a result of the 
industrial accident? £e v\ j^v'jyV^-e f^cj kzcJL C^V«L-
8. What is the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to 
previously-existing conditions, whether due to accidental 'injury, disease or , , \ 
congenital causes? §&£$^ SO 7* X # ^ % - #. AS* % (LffAf fl^ *y + *<T«ti*J 
9. What is the applicant's total physical impairment, if any, resulting from 
all causes and conditions, including the industrial injury? JPt^ /o 
10. Did the industrial injury aggravate the applicant's pre-existing 
condition? Please explain as necessary. *S f <?<£ *t-&4/V/ <L ^ & <?5 7Vo v* * 
*3fday of <£L r /€ £„ ~< ft <*!'?) 
Physician's Name (Please Print) 
^ / * ^ l 198/.$ &v'1r£? t fife c/cC Ju Y% *Y V 
Physician's SoecLalty ' 
y^e So </<?d £ 
Street Address 
/Sdc^^fcc/, L£f frof* 
City and State 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
G. CARMEN HERRERA, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
SPERRY CORPORATION, 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendant. 
CASE No. 85000559 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, on November 19, 
1985, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Orgg?' and 
Notice of the Commission. 
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge. 
The Applicant was present and represented by Wesley M. 
Lang, Attorney at Law. 
The Defendants were represented by Thomas Kay, 
Attorney at Law. 
The issues presented in this matter were as follows: 
1. Whether the Applicant sustained injuries as the result *>f a 
compensable industrial accident on May 3, 1985. 
2# Causal relationship of the incident to the Applicant's alleged 
injuries. 
3. Temporary total disability compensation from May 6, 1985 through 
the present date. 
A* Permanent partial impairment. 
5. Medical expenses. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Inasmuch as one of the above listed issues is dispositive of the 
others, the Administrative Law Judge will deal only with the issue of whether 
the Applicant sustained injuries as the result of a compensable industrial 
accident. 
G. CARMEN HERRERA 
FINDING OF FACT 
PAGE TWO 
The Applicant in this matter, G. Carmen Herrera, is a twenty-five 
year old female who began working for the defendants at the ovens making 
computer parts approximately^.six^months prior to the date of her injury. Her 
duties included placing computer^units in the oven, pulling them out and 
placing them on conveyor belts* The units themselves varied greatly in size, 
ranging from twenty to one hundred-pounds. On the date of the alleged injury, 
the Applicant was working ~with units which weighed approximately ^thirty 
pounds. At the time of her alleged injury, the Applicant was earning $6.59 
per hour working forty hours per week regular time and approximately^five 
hours per week on overtimed The-Applicant was not married, nor did she have 
any dependent children under the age of eighteen. 
On May 3, 1985, the Applicant squatted down to pick up a unit which 
weighed approximately thirty pounds. As she straightened, she felt a snap and 
tingling pain in her low back. The Applicant informed her supervisor of the 
problem. She then went to the nurse* s station and obtained some medication 
for pain. She was able to finish her shift. 
The incident occurred on a Friday. The Applicant stayed in bed all 
during the weekend because of her pain. She went to work on Monday with 
continuing pain and was sent by her supervisor and the nurse to Dr. Anderson. 
Her first visit with Dr. Anderson occurred on May 6, 1985. At that time, 
x-rays were taken and an examination was done. The Applicant was taken off 
work for the rest of the week. Her leave later extended through September. 
During that time, the Applicant was referred to Dr. Chester Powell. She also 
saw Dr. Gene Smith upon a referral from her attorney. 
The Applicant returned to work on September 23, 1985 per her doctor's 
release. She has a new job where she is able to regulate her activities. At 
the time of the hearing, she still had a constant backache and was not able to 
participate in any of her regular activities such as jogging or roller skating. 
During the time the Applicant was out of work, she did receive the 
$181.00 a week payment from a disability insurance policy. 
The Applicant has had some prior injuries to her left knee and left 
hip. She indicated, however, that prior to May 3, 1985, she had never had any 
problems with her low back. 
In reviewing the facts in this matter, it is the considered opinion 
of the Administrative Law Judge that the Applicant has not met her burden in 
demonstrating that a compensable industrial accident occurred on May 3, 1985. 
Counsel for the Applicant cites the MONFREDI case as precedence finding that 
the Applicant sustained injuries as the result of a compensable accident. 
However, the Administrative Law Judge notes that there were substantial 
differences between the facts in the Applicant's case and those in the 
MONFREDI case. In that instance, the worker was performing a usual work 
activity; however, the Applicant had also had numerous prior industrial 
injuries to his low back and the Court adjudged the incident of usual activity 
to be a culmination of the results of the prior industrial accidents. The 
G. CARMEN HERRERA 
FINDING OF FACT 
PAGE THREE 
Applicant in this matter has no record of prior industrial injuries to her low 
back. The facts_in this case are much closer to those announced in the SABQ 
case. Although it is clear in this case that the ApplicantJJOactiyijty_j*as 
work related, there was nothing junusual about the activity- The Applicant 
testified that she had lifted s heavier computers at various times. 
Additionally, she indicated very clearly on the record that her normal 
procedure in lifting the parts was to squat, lift and straighten and then turn 
to place them on the conveyor belt. She testified that there was no variation 
from this procedure on May 3,- 1985* There is nothing to take her activity on 
that day out of' the realm of what could be considered usual and normal 
activities, ynder the Applicant's description, Jthe same type of injury could 
have just as easily occurred had she bent down to pick up a clothes basket or 
a bag of groceries. 
The Administrative Law Judge notes that there is some question as to 
whether a work relationship between the activity and the injury is sufficient 
to allow for a finding of compensable accident. The matter is currently 
pending before the Supreme Court in three cases which have been joined for 
hearing. It is very possible .that the decisions in those cases may alter a 
finding such as this one of "no accident". 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Applicant in this matter, G. Carmen Herrera, has failed in her 
burden to demonstrate that she sustained injuries as the result of a 
compensable industrial accident on May 3, 1985 and her claim for benefits 
should be denied. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of G. Carmen Herrera, 
Applicant, be, in the same is hereby, dismissed. 
a^et\L. MoffittTT/ 
raministrative LawvJt/dge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
27 day of November, 1985 
ATTEST: 
/s/ Linda J- Strasburg 
Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No, 85000559 
G. CARMEN HERRERA, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
SFERRY CORPORATION and/or 
TRAVELERS INSURANCE and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants . 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
DENIAL OF 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
On or about November 27, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administra-
tive Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were .denied in the above 
entitled case. 
On or about December 12, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Applicant by and through her attorney. 
Thereaf r, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge of November 27, 1985, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the 
Motion for Review shall bs, and the cczio ij hereby, dariie*!. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
ATTEST: d a y o f J a n u a r ) r » 1 9 8 6 . . 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
y 
* ! - , ZlrffitK^Cfr-rs/ 
Linda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
Commissioner * 
Lenice~"L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
